University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

6-2016

Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law: Repurposing Federal IV-D
Funding to Expand Community-Based Legal and Social Services
for Parents
Lisa V. Martin
University of South Carolina School of Law, lvmartin@law.sc.edu

Stacy Brustin
Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, brustin@law.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stacy Brustin & Lisa Martin, Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law: Repurposing Federal IV-D Funding to
Expand Community-Based Legal and Social Services for Parents, 67 Hastings L.J. 1265 (2016).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Hastings Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 5

Article 4

6-2016

Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law:
Repurposing Federal IV-D Funding to Expand
Community-Based Legal and Social Services for
Parents
Stacy Brustin
Lisa Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stacy Brustin and Lisa Martin, Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law: Repurposing Federal IV-D Funding to Expand Community-Based
Legal and Social Services for Parents, 67 Hastings L.J. 1265 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol67/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

I - Brustin_19 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

6/19/2016 12:04 PM

Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law:
Repurposing Federal IV-D Funding to Expand
Community-Based Legal and Social Services
for Parents
Stacy Brustin* and Lisa Martin**
Parents in family court overwhelmingly proceed pro se; however, in child support
courtrooms, government attorneys representing the state child support agency frequently
play a pivotal role. These attorneys represent the state’s ostensible interests in ensuring
that children are financially supported and in preventing welfare dependence; they do not
represent individual parents. The outcomes of child support proceedings have profound,
long-term constitutional and financial implications for parents, yet litigants rarely
understand their rights or the role of the government.
Originally, the goal of state child support enforcement efforts was to recapture the costs of
welfare expenditures. In 1990, two-thirds of cases involved families receiving public
assistance. However, this number has declined dramatically and public assistance cases
constitute only fourteen percent of the states’ caseloads. Recognizing that cost recapture is
no longer a sustainable mission, the federal program administering the funding of state
support agencies has attempted to rebrand the mission to one promoting shared
parenting. Although well-intentioned, this shift in mission has led to proposals that would
further increase government involvement in private family law matters and threaten due
process for parents determining whether and how to share parenting responsibilities.

* Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Civil Practice Clinic, Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America; J.D., Harvard Law School. Brustin represents low-income clients in a
variety of civil disputes, including paternity and child support, custody, visitation, public benefits, and
employment matters. She is a Commissioner on the D.C. Child Support Guideline Commission.
** Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Co-Director, Families and the Law Clinic, Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Martin
represents low-income individuals who have been subjected to domestic violence in civil protection
order, child custody, child support matters, and affirmative immigration matters.
For their helpful comments and insights, the authors thank the participants in the 2015 Clinical
Law Review Writer’s Workshop and the 2015 Southern Clinical Conference Works in Progress
Session. The authors also thank Law Librarian Emily Black and Research Assistant Norah Sloss for
their excellent support.
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Rather than enlarging the government child support apparatus, it is time to reevaluate the
role of the state and devise new mechanisms for ensuring effective family dispute
resolution. This Article proposes that state child support agencies focus on areas in which
the government has a clear state interest and specialized capability, for example,
identification of income and assets; collection and distribution of child support payments;
and administrative enforcement. Rather than continuing to fund state cadres of child
support enforcement attorneys and expand their involvement in private family law
disputes, the Article suggests that Congress and state legislatures redirect funding to
community-based legal and social services organizations that can provide expertise,
neutrality, and a range of assistance in custody, parental access, and child support matters
involving low-income families.
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Introduction
The lack of legal representation in family courts has reached a crisis
point. “[F]ar from being exceptional, pro se litigants are now the norm in
1
family courts across the country.” Family law representation consistently
is one of the most highly demanded services that civil legal aid

1. Jane C. Murphy & Jana B. Singer, Divorced from Reality: Rethinking Family Dispute
Resolution 69 (2015).
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2

organizations provide. Demand is so high that family matters constitute
both the largest share of case dockets and the largest share of unmet
3
requests for representation for many legal services organizations.
The rise in unrepresented parties impacts the functioning of family
4
courts. The lack of lawyers strains court resources and creates delays in
5
court dockets that prolong family disputes. Although family courts are
6
taking steps to better accommodate unrepresented individuals, the
persistent dearth of available legal representation creates significant
challenges for parents navigating family disputes in adjudicated
7
proceedings and court-based mediation programs. Parents are more
likely to succeed in securing the outcomes they desire in family court
8
cases when represented or at least advised by counsel. Without legal
counsel, parents may not understand important issues such as the scope
of their legal rights and responsibilities, the pros and cons of formalizing
versus privately ordering their parenting affairs, the legal presumptions
and factors that govern how courts allocate parenting rights and
responsibilities, and how financial and caretaking responsibilities
interrelate. In such circumstances, parents might reach agreements
contrary to their interests or litigate claims that have little chance of
9
succeeding.
2. D.C. Access to Justice Comm’n, Justice for All? An Examination of the Civil Legal
Needs of the District of Columbia’s Low-Income Community 7–9 (2008); Legal Servs. Corp., By
the Numbers: The Data Underlying Legal Aid Programs 14, 17 (2014).
3. Legal Servs. Corp., supra note 2, at 17; Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap
in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans 11 (2009)
[hereinafter Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap].
4. Joy Moses, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of
America’s Pro Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants 8 (2011).
5. Id.; see Jona Goldschmidt et al., Am. Judicature Soc’y & State Justice Inst., Meeting the
Challenges of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers 49–
53 (1998). But see John M. Greacen, Ctr. for Families, Children & the Courts, Self Represented
Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know 9–10 (2003).
This report suggests that case-processing times in family courts might be faster where parties proceed
as pro se. This may be, as one commentator suggests, because pro se litigants have simpler cases or
because lawyers employ time delay tactics or overly complicate matters. See Moses, supra note 4, at 8.
Or it may be because pro se litigants are unaware of or fail to bring witnesses or other sources of
evidence to support their claims, or lack knowledge of legal arguments to raise or procedural tactics to
employ to best present their cases.
6. See Pro Se Resources by State, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/
resources/pro_se_unbundling_resource_center/pro_se_resources_by_state.html (last visited May 29, 2016);
Am. Bar Ass’n, The Self-Help Center Census: A National Survey (2014).
7. Murphy & Singer, supra note 1, at 68–67. We recognize that nonparent caregivers might be
parties in family law proceedings. However, this Article focuses on those visitation or parenting,
paternity, and child support cases involving litigants who are the biological or adoptive parents of the
children at issue.
8. Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal
About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 37, 51–56 (2010) (reviewing studies on
family court outcomes for represented and unrepresented parties).
9. Murphy & Singer, supra note 1, at 71.
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Litigants in family law matters generally enter the court through one
of two gateways: the domestic relations portal or the paternity/child
10
support portal. Which gateway litigants use often depends upon
whether the individuals are married, have conflicts over parenting, seek
11
financial support, or receive public assistance. Those seeking divorces
as well as those who are unmarried and seeking adjudication of
12
caretaking and child access typically file and litigate these claims in
13
domestic relations courts. Individuals (more often unmarried) seeking
financial support for children, or those who assign their right to collect
child support to the state as a condition of receiving public assistance,
14
often have their cases adjudicated in paternity and child support courts.
Parents in both court settings overwhelmingly proceed pro se;
however, in child support courtrooms, government attorneys and
paralegals acting on behalf of the state often play a pivotal role in the
15
proceedings. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have child
support enforcement agencies which operate under the funding control
16
of the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”). Often
known as IV-D agencies—named after the title of the Social Security Act
17
that governs them —state child support enforcement agencies are
comprised of caseworkers, investigators, and lawyers, who collectively
work to determine paternity, establish child support, and enforce support
18
orders against noncustodial parents. IV-D agencies are authorized to

10. See Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended
Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 803,
813–15 (2015); see also Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital
Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 183 (2015). A third gateway, not addressed in this Article, is the
domestic violence portal. Domestic violence protection order cases can result in orders of temporary
custody, visitation, and child support. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Domestic Violence, Domestic
Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) by State (2008); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (1993).
11. See Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 811–15.
12. Some state statutes use the terms custody (physical and legal) and visitation to describe these
parental rights and responsibilities whereas other states use the terms parenting orders or parental
access orders. Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure § 4.1, Westlaw (database
updated June 2015).
13. Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 812–15.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 817, 836–37; see Stacy L. Brustin, Making Turner a Reality—Improving Access to Justice
Through Court-Annexed Resource Centers and Same Day Representation, 20 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 17,
18–20 (2015); Barbara Glesner Fines, From Representing “Clients” to Serving “Recipients”:
Transforming the Role of the IV-D Child Support Enforcement Attorney, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2155
(1999). See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of Child Support Enf’t,
Essentials for Attorneys in Child Enforcement 34 (2002) (reviewing novel issues complicating
representation in child support enforcement).
16. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Child Support Handbook 2 (2013).
17. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654 (2014) (Title IV-D).
18. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 16, at 2.
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initiate paternity and child support actions, and they do so on a broad
scale. Today, IV-D agencies are playing a role in fifty to sixty percent of
20
all child support matters in the United States.
The frequent participation of state IV-D attorneys in child support
courtrooms is striking not only because of the persistent dearth of
attorneys representing the parents’ interests (government attorneys
represent the state, not individual parents), but also because the state
lacks a cognizable interest in the vast majority of the child support
proceedings in which state attorneys play a role. States automatically
pursue child support when a parent receives Temporary Assistance for
21
Needy Families (“TANF”) benefits in an attempt to recoup the cost of
22
this public assistance expenditure. States also pursue child support at
the request of parents not receiving TANF in exchange for a nominal
23
fee. As many as ninety percent of IV-D cases involve low-income
24
families who are not presently receiving TANF benefits. Child support
claims in these cases do not implicate the state’s interest in recouping
welfare costs unless arrears remain outstanding from when a family was
25
receiving TANF benefits. Rather, these cases involve private disputes
between parents about how to financially support their children.
The outcomes of child support proceedings have profound, longterm constitutional and financial implications for parents, yet litigants
rarely understand the procedural and substantive rights that they could
invoke to assert their interests. When IV-D matters reach the court, the
state agency is represented by attorneys directly employed by the state or
26
contracted to represent the agency. These attorneys do not represent
19. 42 U.S.C. § 654.
20. Carmen Solomon-Fears, Cong. Research Serv., Child Support Enforcement: Program
Basics 1 (2014).
21. The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program replaced the former Aid for
Dependent Children program in 1996 as the source of federal cash welfare benefits to needy families.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2016); 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.32, 302.50 (2016); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., supra note 15, at 2–3.
23. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984);
see Vicki Turetsky, What If All the Money Came Home? Welfare Cost Recovery in the Child Support
Program, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 402, 403 (2005).
24. Kye Lippold & Elaine Sorensen, Urban Inst., Characteristics of Families Served by the Child
Support (IV-D) Program: 2010 Census Survey Results 7 (2013) (estimating that ninety percent of families
served by IV-D agencies in 2009 were not receiving TANF); Child Support Enforcement Introduction and
Overview, Green Book (Aug. 9, 2012), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2012-green-book/
child-support-enforcement-cover-page/introduction-and-overview (estimating that eighty-six percent of
families served by IV-D agencies are not currently receiving TANF).
25. Arrears accrued during the time period when a custodial parent receives TANF continue to
be assigned to the state after the parent stops receiving TANF benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(7)(F),
657(b)(1)(B) (2016).
26. Glesner Fines, supra note 15, at 2159; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra
note 15, at 38. Some states have recruited volunteer attorneys to assist the state in enforcing child
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either parent but, instead, represent the state’s interest in securing
27
support for children and preventing welfare dependence. In many
states, the parent who is owed child support is not considered a party to
28
the case. Instead, such parents are treated as witnesses, and they must
29
formally intervene as a party to the case in order to assert their rights.
State attorneys determine the strategies to pursue in the case and may or
may not consult with the parent owed support regarding possible
30
settlement of the child support matter. There is no attorney-client
privilege between state attorneys and parents who are owed support. As
a result, any information relayed by a parent to a state attorney in
settlement discussions or in preparation for hearings is not confidential
31
and may be disclosed without the parent’s consent. If parents who
receive TANF do not appear at child support hearings, state attorneys
32
proceed in their absence. Parents who affirmatively seek assistance
from state child support agencies are frequently confused about the role
of state attorneys and mistakenly assume that the attorneys represent
33
their interests.
States often bring these paternity and support actions against
34
parents with limited financial means who cannot afford representation.
These individuals typically proceed pro se, and frequently understand
35
neither their rights nor the child support adjudication process. Defendants
in child support cases are shepherded through state-facilitated negotiation
processes in which government attorneys or paralegals meet with them,
request documentation of income, use these documents to calculate an
amount of support to be paid under the child support guideline, urge the
defendants to enter into consent child support agreements, draft the

support orders on a pro bono basis. See also Anita Davis, TYLA and AG’s Office Launch Child
Support Enforcement Project, 63 Tex. B.J. 978, 978–79 (2000).
27. Glesner Fines, supra note 15, at 2163–64; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note
15, at 34.
28. Stacy Brustin, More than a Witness: The Role of Custodial Parents in the IV-D Child Support
Process, 26 Child. Legal Rts. J. 37, 43–44 (2006).
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id. at 45–46.
31. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 15, at 49; Brustin & Martin, supra note 10,
at 817; Glesner Fines, supra note 15, at 2181–82; Paula Roberts, Attorney-Client Relationship and the
IV-D System: Protection Against Inadvertent Disclosure of Damaging Information, 19 Clearinghouse
Rev. 158, 158–59 (1985).
32. Brustin, supra note 28, at 44, 73.
33. Id. at 46; Roberts, supra note 31, at 158.
34. See Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers,
39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 991, 1002–03 (2006) and sources cited therein.
35. Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for “Deadbroke”
Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support Issues, 37 Clearinghouse Rev. 5, 8–9
(2003); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement,
and Fatherless Children, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 358 (2005).
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36

agreements, and present them to the judge. Defendants are often
uninformed about available defenses to child support claims and
potential credits or deductions that might reduce the amount they are
37
required to pay. If a defendant does not consent to a negotiated
38
agreement, he must defend himself in evidentiary hearings against
39
experienced government attorneys.
Because state agencies provide a widely accessible, low-cost
mechanism for securing and enforcing child support, many legal services
providers have prioritized other critical legal needs and decline to
40
represent parents in paternity and support matters. Yet, the IV-D
system has proven to be insufficient in serving the legal needs of pro se
parents seeking support and often is heavy handed or coercive in its dealings
with pro se parties from whom the government seeks to collect child
41
support.
The work of IV-D agencies is expanding the reach of government in
42
the lives of low-income families. Recognizing that cost recapture is no
longer a sustainable purpose for the IV-D bureaucracy, OCSE has been
working to reorient the IV-D mission to more holistically address the
needs of low-income families by, for example, offering assistance with
43
job training and the establishment of shared parenting arrangements.
Although well intentioned, this shift in the IV-D mission has led to
proposals that would further increase government involvement in lowincome families and decrease access to justice for parents, for example,
by mandating that all child support orders sought by IV-D programs also
include awards of custody and visitation, regardless of whether the
44
parents want this relief.
36. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 897, 910–11 (2013); Lisa Kelly, If
Anybody Asks You Who I Am: An Outsider’s Story of the Duty to Establish Paternity, 6 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 297, 299–305 (1994).
37. Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 9.
38. This Article departs from this Journal’s standard use of feminine pronouns to reflect the
reality that most defendants in child support cases are fathers. Lippold & Sorenson, supra note 24, at 7
(noting that eighty-two percent of custodial parents (the petitioners in child support cases) served by
IV-D agencies in 2009 were mothers).
39. Id. at 13.
40. Paula Roberts, Child Support—An Important but Often Overlooked Issue for Low-Income
Clients, in Poverty Law Manual for the New Lawyer 196 (2002).
41. See generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1029, 1029 (2007)
(“examin[ing] the government policy of seeking reimbursement of welfare costs through child support
enforcement”).
42. See Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 806–07; Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family
Law, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 229, 256–68 (2000).
43. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 16, at 5–7.
44. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 303, 128 Stat.
1919, 1946 (2014); Flexibility, Efficiency, and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs, 79
Fed. Reg. 68,548, 68,580 (proposed Nov. 17, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 302); Child Support and
Fatherhood Initiative in the Administration’s FY2014 Budget, Off. Child Support Enforcement (Apr.
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This moment of potential expansion provides an opportunity to
reflect on IV-D functions given the dramatic changes in the agency’s
mission and caseload since the federal program’s inception. That is, now
that the state has a cost recapture interest in only fourteen percent of child
45
support cases, should federal and state governments continue to support
widespread IV-D involvement in what otherwise would be private family
law litigation or consider something new? This Article suggests that
rather than further enlarging the functions of the government child
support apparatus, it is time to pause, reevaluate the appropriate role of
IV-D agencies, and devise new mechanisms for ensuring greater due
process and more effective dispute resolution for parents who are
determining how to share responsibilities for raising and supporting their
children.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the current state
of the IV-D system. Part II suggests that it is time to streamline the IV-D
program to reduce the agency’s involvement in individual paternity and
child support establishment cases. The Article proposes that state
agencies focus on activities in which the government has a direct interest
and specialized capability, primarily in the location of assets, distribution
of child support payments, and administrative enforcement. Part II then
suggests that rather than continuing to institutionalize state cadres of
child support enforcement attorneys, federal and state governments
should redirect this funding to legal and social services organizations.
Those organizations can then provide expertise, neutrality, and a
panoply of limited assistance, mediation, and representation options in
custody, visitation, and child support matters involving low-income
parents. Part III highlights some of the risks that the proposal to
restructure the current IV-D model entail.
I. The IV-D System
A. The Framework—A Federalized System
46

Family law is traditionally considered the province of the state.
The reality is more complex. Throughout the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries Congress has used its spending power to advance
federal policy objectives regarding families in areas including paternity

15, 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/child-support-and-fatherhood-initiative-in-theadministrations-fy-2016; see also Brustin & Martin, supra note 10.
45. See Child Support Enforcement Introduction and Overview, supra note 24.
46. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“‘[R]egulation of domestic relations’ is
‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’” (citation
omitted)).
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and child support, child abuse and neglect, healthy marriages, and
47
engaged fatherhood.
In the child support context, Congress has federalized the legal and
procedural framework of paternity establishment and child support
enforcement through the power of the purse. State child support
programs are financed by five funding streams: (1) state appropriations;
(2) federal reimbursement of two-thirds of state expenditures; (3) child
support payments assigned to states; (4) federal incentive payments
conditioned on state programs meeting certain standards; and
48
(5) application fees and costs assessed to non-welfare families. Federal
legislation requires states to establish and maintain federally approved
child support enforcement programs in order to be eligible for funding
49
50
for the TANF cash welfare benefits program. To ensure effective
oversight and implementation, Congress established the federal OCSE
within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and
dedicated funding to support state child support enforcement programs
51
that meet federal standards.
Federal oversight of state child support programming is robust.
States must establish IV-D agencies. These agencies must provide seven
primary services, and in doing so, must comply with detailed regulations
52
governing each function. IV-D programs must assist with “(1) parent
47. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States,
18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 267 (2009) (evaluating three varieties of federalism present in family
law); see also Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 Colum. J. Gender & L. 197, 211–22 (1999); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1297, 1373–86 (1998).
48. Solomon-Fears, supra note 20; see Michael E. Fishman, et al., U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Servs., State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs 1–2 (1999).
49. The TANF program replaced the former Aid for Dependent Children program in 1996.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (2016); Carmen Solomon-Fears, Cong. Research Serv., Child
Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues 25 (2013)
(“Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a provision in federal law
that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the CSE program with a reduction
in Title IV-A funding.”). State eligibility for full TANF funding is also conditioned on state operation
of foster care and adoption assistance programs. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (2016). A report by the
Congressional Research Service explains:
States are responsible for administering the [Child Support Enforcement] program, but the
federal government plays a major role in dictating the major design features of state
programs, funding state and local programs, monitoring and evaluating state programs,
providing technical assistance, and giving direct assistance to states in locating absent
parents and obtaining child support payments.
Carmen Solomon-Fears, Cong. Research Serv., Analysis of Federal-State Financing of the
Child Support Enforcement Program 1 (2012).
51. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669b (2016)); see Solomon-Fears, supra note 20, at 7–8.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655, 658 (2016); 45 C.F.R. §§ 301–310 (2016). See generally Naomi R. Cahn
& Jane C. Murphy, Collecting Child Support: A History of Federal and State Initiatives, 34
Clearinghouse Rev. 165, 167 (2000) (reviewing federal involvement in the child support arena).
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location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support
orders, (4) review and modification of child support orders, (5) collection
of child support payments, (6) distribution of child support payments,
53
and (7) establishment and enforcement of medical support.” To qualify
for federal incentive payments, IV-D agencies must meet performance
goals for establishing paternity and child support orders, collecting
current child support and arrearages, and maintaining the cost54
effectiveness of the IV-D program. States that fail to achieve targeted
performance levels and those that fail to comply with program
requirements may be subject to financial penalties that reduce the state’s
55
TANF block grant award or disqualify the state from federal incentive
56
payments.
IV-D agencies perform these functions on behalf of three different
constituencies: current TANF recipients, individuals who formerly
received TANF, and parents or caretakers who have never received
57
TANF. Today, among some types of families, IV-D agency involvement
is ubiquitous. IV-D agencies are estimated to provide services to more
58
than sixty percent of all nonmarital families in the United States, and
nearly eighty percent of nonmarital families whose incomes fall below
59
the federal poverty threshold. Parents receiving services from IV-D
agencies are predominately of low to moderate income and have lower
levels of education than parents living apart from one another who do
60
not receive IV-D services. IV-D agencies have much less interaction
61
with parents who have higher incomes and levels of education. Such
62
parents are more likely to marry and resolve issues relating to child
support through divorce proceedings or opt out of litigation altogether in
63
favor of alternative forms of dispute resolution. Because these parents
are better able to afford private counsel, they need not rely on the state
to navigate child support claims. The tendency of income levels and
marital status to vary along racial lines means that parents interacting
53. Solomon-Fears, supra note 20, at 2; see Cahn & Murphy, supra note 52, at 167.
54. Solomon-Fears, supra note 50, at 4–5.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 658a(a)–(b) (2016).
57. Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 816.
58. Lippold & Sorensen, supra note 24; Solomon-Fears, supra note 20, at 1.
59. Lippold & Sorensen, supra note 24, at 14.
60. Id. (“Custodial families most likely to receive [state child support] services are poor, nevermarried, younger, and less educated.”); see U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Justification of
Estimates for Appropriations Committees: Fiscal Year 2016, at 289 (2015) (“Approximately half of
families in the [IV-D child support] program are below 150 percent of the poverty level, while 90
percent are below 400 percent of poverty.”).
61. Lippold & Sorenson, supra note 24, at 4, 11–12.
62. Richard Fry, New Census Data Show More Americans Are Tying the Knot, but Mostly It’s the
College-Educated, Pew Res. Ctr. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/06/
new-census-data-show-more-americans-are-tying-the-knot-but-mostly-its-the-college-educated/.
63. Lippold & Sorensen, supra note 24, at 24 tbl.2.
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with IV-D agencies are also disproportionately members of minority
64
groups.
B. Expanding and Rebranding the IV-D Mission
Congress initially established the federal child support enforcement
program to recapture the cost of welfare expenditures, reduce future
65
welfare costs, and enable custodial parents to collect child support.
Over time, Congress’s mission expanded to include serving the additional
66
needs of families involved with child support programs. For example,
since 1984, Congress has permitted states to pass-through a portion of
the child support amounts collected in TANF cases to the family, without
67
impacting the family’s eligibility to receive TANF benefits. Congress
has also funded programs within child support agencies to facilitate
68
noncustodial parents’ employment and access to their children.
This shift in the program’s mission follows the dramatic shift in child
support agency caseloads since the enactment of Title IV-D, as welfare
reforms have steadily reduced the number of families receiving welfare
69
benefits. In 1990, two-thirds of IV-D cases to collect child support were
70
brought on behalf of parents receiving welfare benefits. Today, as few
as ten percent of families receiving IV-D services currently receive
71
TANF benefits—as many as ninety percent of such families do not. As
a result, child support agencies today are primarily engaged in resolving
civil family law disputes between private parties.
The federal OCSE has embraced Congress’s expanded mission for
child support programs. According to OCSE, the primary goals of the
current IV-D system include decreasing child poverty, encouraging coparenting, encouraging shared financial support of children,
strengthening parenting skills, encouraging economic self-sufficiency,

64. Id. at 9, 44 tbls.12–14; Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New
Families 9–11 (2010); Diana B. Elliot et al., Historical Marriage Trends from 1890–2010: A Focus on
Race Differences (SESHD, Working Paper No. 2012-12).
65. Solomon-Fears, supra note 50, at 1.
66. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Child Support Strategic Plan: FY 2010–
2014, at 5–6 (2013).
67. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2640(c), 98 Stat. 494, 1145 (1984); 42
U.S.C. §§ 644, 657 (2009). See, e.g., Michelle Vinson & Vicki Turetsky, Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy,
State Child Support Pass-Through Policies (2009); Child Support Pass-Through and Disregard
Policies for Public Assistance Recipients, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/state-policy-pass-through-disregard-child-support.aspx.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)(C) (2016); Jessica Pearson et al., A New Look at an Old Issue: An
Evaluation of the State Access and Visitation Grant Program, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 372, 372 (2005).
69. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Brustin & Martin, supra note
10, at 818.
70. Glesner Fines, supra note 15, at 2165.
71. See Lippold & Sorensen, supra note 24, at 7.
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and decreasing welfare dependence. To carry out these broader family
relationship-based goals, OCSE has attempted to rebrand the IV-D
program as a family-friendly initiative designed to help low-income
73
mothers and fathers share in the financial support of their children.
Recent policy proposals by Congress and the OCSE signal a growing
interest in expanding IV-D services to address child custody and
74
visitation within child support orders established by state agencies. IVD agencies in some states already perform this function under state
75
laws. This expansion would essentially make IV-D agencies the primary
arbiters of both child support and child custody disputes among low to
76
moderate-income families.
Although many of these goals are worthy, the rebranding effort
conflicts with IV-D agencies’ continued prosecutorial role. To facilitate
collection and enforcement, IV-D agencies utilize a wide array of tools
including garnishment of wages, imputation of income, tax intercepts,
revocation of licenses, and even incarceration following court findings of
77
civil or criminal contempt. The use of these tools cause parents,
particularly low-income fathers, to view IV-D agencies as prosecutorial
entities whose sole interest is taking their money or locking them up for
78
failing to pay support.
Expanding the program’s scope also could further compromise IVD agencies’ ability to effectively carry out existing functions. Many IV-D
72. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 66, at 5–6.
73. Id.
74. See sources cited supra note 44.
75. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.007 (West 2016); see also Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Child Support and Parenting Time: Improving Coordination to Benefit Children 2–3 (2013).
76. See supra Part I.A.
77. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 16, at 23–25. Although some agencies
have attempted to reduce the punitive nature of enforcement efforts by pursuing imputation and
contempt less frequently, these tools remain available to the programs. Id. at 23–24. Other IV-D
programs have not embraced the shift toward a kinder, gentler approach. Hatcher, supra note 41,
1048–51.
78. Maureen Waller & Robert Plotnick, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Child Support and LowIncome Families: Perceptions, Practices, and Policy, at viii–ix (1999). This study found that many
custodial parents receiving TANF are opposed to assigning their rights to child support. Id. at vii. They
view the system as ineffective and unresponsive. Id. Waller and Plotnick note that fathers reported
two primary concerns with IV-D enforcement:
[t]he first is the system’s inability to recognize or respond to their unstable economic
circumstances. . . . The second major problem cited by fathers is the practice of treating
them as criminals when they fail to make payments. Fathers often believe that heightened
enforcement practices ignore or even impede their efforts to support or be involved with
their children. Others maintain that the system penalizes fathers indiscriminately.
Moreover, they believe that the system is more likely to pursue fathers working in the
regular economy than those who turn to the underground economy.
Id. at viii–ix; see Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 Geo. J. on Poverty L. &
Pol’y 127, 133 (2011); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 373–74 (2005).
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agencies currently lack sufficient resources to locate assets, conduct
surveillance, and gather evidence to prove that a noncustodial parent
who is not earning a steady garnishable wage has the ability to pay
79
support. Insufficient staffing at many agencies causes backlogs, delays
80
case processing, and hinders effective customer service. Without
significant increases in funding, increasing IV-D programs’ scope will
only exacerbate existing challenges.
Most important, the expansion of the IV-D mission has further
81
compromised parental autonomy. Parents who receive TANF benefits
must assign their rights to pursue child support to the state and cooperate
with state efforts to collect child support payments, regardless of whether
82
the parent desires that relief. Parents who would like legal assistance
pursuing child support claims have few alternatives to IV-D agency
83
support. Working with IV-D agencies means that parents give up their
ability to control the means and objectives of the representation as well
84
as the privileges and ethical protections attendant to legal counsel.
Structuring IV-D assistance to advance the state’s interests leaves lowincome custodial and noncustodial parents without an advocate for their
own interests in child support proceedings. Recent policy proposals
potentially would require all child support orders sought by IV-D
agencies—in TANF and non-TANF cases—to include provisions
addressing custody and visitation of the children at issue, regardless of
whether either parent wants the court to define these rights and
79. See, e.g., Nat’l Child Support Enf’t Assoc., Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 6
(Jan. 14, 2015) (“While extensive discovery such as investigators, depositions, interrogatories, and
subpoenas duces tecum might lead to admissible evidence related to unreported income and lifestyle,
IV-D agencies simply do not have the resources necessary to conduct such discovery. Absent this, the
practical ability to establish a support obligation through lifestyle evidence is minimal.”); see also
Mich. Supreme Court, Underground Economy 22 (2010) (recognizing the limited resources available
to child support agencies and the IRS to investigate those evading payment of child support and urging
collaboration among multiple government agencies and private financial institutions).
80. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 26, at 980 (noting that in 2000, Texas had more than one million
open IV-D child support cases, an average of 6300 cases for each of the 175 assistant attorneys general
in the Texas child support system). See generally Office of Child Support Enf’t, Preliminary Report
FY 2014 (2014) (including data on the total number of open child support cases and the total number
of full-time equivalent staff in the child support programs of each state from 2010 to 2014). The
District of Columbia, for example, had 51,222 open cases and 239 FTE staff members in 2014, for an
average of 214 cases per staff member. Id.
81. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by Rethinking Forced
and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 Am. U. J. Gender, Soc. Pol’y & L. 775, 781–82 (2012).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2016); Hatcher, supra note 41, at 1045, 1069 (describing why custodial
parents might not choose to cooperate with child support collection efforts if given the choice and
noting that formal enforcement of child support may result in the cessation of in-kind support);
Maldonado, supra note 34, at 1005–10 (describing the types of in-kind child support contributions
noncustodial parents often make and the reasons why custodial parents may not choose to pursue
child support).
83. Roberts, supra note 40, at 196.
84. See sources cited supra note 15.
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responsibilities. In all of these ways, IV-D policies have eroded the
ability of low-income parents to choose for themselves whether and how
to resolve issues regarding financial and caretaking responsibilities for
86
children.
C. The Impact of State IV-D Agency Involvement on the Judicial
Adjudicatory Process
Most states establish child support orders through judicial processes.
Some use a judicial process, whereas others use a mix of judicial and
87
administrative adjudication. Approximately twenty-eight states and the
District of Columbia determine paternity and establish support orders
88
exclusively through judicial processes. In these “judicial” jurisdictions,
attorneys directly employed or contracted by the IV-D agency typically
represent the state. Along with paralegals and other IV-D administrative
staff, IV-D attorneys work to establish paternity, child support, and
medical support orders, as well as modify and enforce existing support
89
orders.
85. See sources cited supra note 44. Such requirements already exist under state law in Texas. See
sources cited supra note 75.
86. See generally Jane C. Murphy & Jane B. Singer, Divorced from Reality: Rethinking
Family Dispute Resolution (2015) (examining the effectiveness of family dispute resolution in the
context of modern day family compositions and structures).
87. Child Support Process: Administrative v. Judicial, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-process-administrative-vs-judicial.aspx
(last
visited May 29, 2016). Some states, however, give administrative courts or agencies exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction to establish and modify support orders. Id.; see also Huntington, supra note 10,
at 183 n.71 (citing Fla. Stat. § 409.2563(2)(a) (2014); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-6-26(a)(1) (West 2014);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 576E-2 (West 2014); 305 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-11 (2014); Iowa Code § 252C.2(3)
(2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.712(2) (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 454.470(1) (2014); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 416.419(2) (2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-710 (2013); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-7A-56.3 (2014);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 233.001(a) (West 2013); Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1903(A) (West 2014)).
88. Including Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
89. See, e.g., Applying for Child Support Services, Ala. Dep’t Hum. Resources
http://dhr.alabama.gov/services/child_support_services/Apply_Child_Support_Svcs.aspx (last visited
May 29, 2016) (“The Alabama Department of Human Resources has agreements with child support
attorneys around the state to provide legal representation. It is the attorney’s duty to pursue the legal
steps necessary to enforce or establish child support obligations from non-custodial parents. The
attorney represents the State of Alabama only. Regardless of whether you receive TANF or not, no
attorney-client relationship will exist between you and the child support attorney. The child support
attorney can address matters of child support only. If an action is filed relating to custody, visitation or
any matter other than support, it will be necessary for you to seek private counsel to represent your
interests in these issues.”); Child Support, Ariz. Att’y Gen. Off., https://www.azag.gov/child-andfamily/child-support (last visited May 29, 2016) (“The Attorney General works with the Arizona
Department of Economic Security (DES), the various counties and the courts to establish and enforce
support obligations. The attorneys and legal staff of the Child Support Service Section (CSSS) provide
legal advice and representation to the Division of Child Support Services (DCSS) within DES. DCSS
is responsible for the statewide operation of the child support program. CSSS represents the program
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in paternity, support order establishment, modification, and enforcement matters in both local and
interstate cases. The CSSS does not represent private individuals. There are eleven CSSS locations,
handling cases in thirteen different counties[] throughout the State of Arizona. In the other counties,
the County Attorney provides child support services.”); Collections and Child Support, St. Conn.,
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/browse.asp?a=2095&bc=0&c=19179 (last visited May 29, 2016) (“In
furtherance of its child support activities, the Department also provides legal services to the
Department of Social Services Bureau of Child Support Enforcement and to the Support Enforcement
Services division of the Judicial Branch pursuant to a cooperative agreement designed to satisfy the
requirements of the federal Social Security Act and related state law.”); Child Support, St. Del.,
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/family/childsupport.shtml (last visited May 29, 2016) (“DOJ
attorneys represent the State, through the Division of Child Support Enforcement, in establishing,
modifying, and enforcing child support orders. In addition, it handles prosecutions of criminal nonsupport
cases.”);
Child
Support
Enforcement
Bureau,
Fla.
Off.
Att’y
Gen.,
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/F33243FEC3E04A6E85256CCB006D06B7 (last visited May
29, 2016) (“The Child Support Enforcement Bureau, General Civil Litigation Division, of the Office
of the Attorney General, represents the Department of Revenue in 12 of Florida’s 67 counties in cases
establishing and enforcing child support orders.”); Idaho: Changing a Child Support Order in Your
State, Admin. for Child. & Fams., (Oct. 2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/
css/id_cs_order.pdf (“If the review indicates the child support order should change, and the parties are
agreeable, a stipulation is completed by CSS, with the assistance of a Deputy Attorney General. The
stipulation, along with an order, is presented to the court for a judge’s signature. If the review indicates
the child support order should change, and both parties are not agreeable, the case is referred to a
Deputy Attorney General. The attorney will take the legal actions necessary to change the court
order, including preparing the legal documents, filing them with the court, and having both parties
served. When both parties are served, they have the option to stipulate or request a hearing. If the
non-requesting party does not respond, a modified order will be entered by default.”); Pub. Aid
Bureau, Office of the Ill. Att’y Gen., Child Support in Illinois: Information for Custodial and
Non-Custodial Parents 1 (2009) (“The Attorney General’s Office has the primary responsibility for
representing HFS/DCSE. However, HFS/DCSE has the authority to contract with other entities for
child support services. HFS/DCSE contracts with the State’s Attorney’s Office in 13 counties
throughout the state, while the Attorney General’s Office handles child support enforcement in 89
counties through its Public Aid Bureau. . . . The Attorney General’s Office is responsible for
establishing paternity as well as establishing, enforcing, and modifying both child support and medical
orders.”); General Information, Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., http://www.in.gov/dcs/2934.htm (last visited
May 29, 2016) (“The Child Support Bureau has entered into cooperative agreements with county
prosecutors in every Indiana county to provide child support enforcement services.”); Child Support
Enforcement Services Provided, State La. Dep’t Child. & Fam. Servs., http://www.dss.state.la.us/
index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=142 (last visited May 29, 2016) (“If an alleged father
refuses to sign an acknowledgment of paternity, Child Support Enforcement attorneys or contract
District Attorneys may file a paternity suit asking the court to determine paternity.”); About Child
Support, Mo. Dep’t Soc. Servs., https://dss.mo.gov/child-support/about-child-support.htm (last visited
May 29, 2016) (“The Child Support program consists of a Central Office located in Jefferson City, two
regional offices, and field offices across the state. The field offices are comprised of supervisory,
investigative and support staff. In addition, local prosecuting attorneys and circuit court clerks assist
with Child Support responsibilities. The majority of prosecutors in Missouri provide legal support
(e.g., the filing of paternity actions, criminal nonsupport and enforcement actions) for cases Child
Support staff refer to them. Circuit court clerks support Child Support staff by filing legal documents
and providing copies of documents already on file.”).
In some states child support services (including legal services) are administered through local
county prosecutor’s offices. See, e.g., Child Support Division, Fayette County Att’y’s Off.,
http://www.fayettecountyattorney.com/child_support.asp (last visited May 29, 2016) (employing fortyeight employees including eight attorneys); Child Support Division, Lancaster Neb. County Att’y’s
Off., http://lancaster.ne.gov/attorney/childsupport.htm (last visited May 29, 2016); Child Support
Enforcement, Lorain County Job & Fam. Servs., http://www.lcdjfs.com/child-support/enforcement
(last visited May 29, 2016) (“The CSEA staff also initiates judicial enforcement actions through the
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In judicial child support jurisdictions, IV-D agency involvement has
changed the dynamic of paternity and child support courtrooms relative
to other family court dockets. Whereas the majority of cases on domestic
relations calendars now proceed without the involvement of attorneys on
90
one or both sides, at least one attorney participates in the majority of
91
cases on child support calendars—the attorney from the IV-D agency.
Although they are not neutral parties in the matter, IV-D attorneys often
serve as negotiators in child support proceedings, encouraging resolution
92
through settlement agreements. To do so, IV-D attorneys or paralegals
review financial information available through automated systems or
brought by the parents; initiate DNA testing where paternity has not
been established; apply child support guideline calculators to derive a
support amount; draft proposed orders; and present settlement terms on
93
the record. In short, state attorneys, paralegals, and caseworkers
assume a quasi-adjudicator role through widespread negotiation of
consent agreements.
Where the parties do not reach settlement, IV-D attorneys conduct
94
contested evidentiary hearings before the court on behalf of the “state.”
The respondents in such proceedings (the parents who owe support) are
Lorain County Prosecutor’s Office, whose attorneys review cases for litigation, recommend
appropriate legal proceedings, conduct pre-trial negotiation and collection activities, and finalize
proceedings and appropriate court orders. The attorneys represent the state of Ohio. Judicial
enforcement tools include: contempt of a court or administrative order; felony non-support; liens;
attachments; and executions.”). But see Judicial Counsel of Cal., Fact Sheet: Child Support
Commissioner and Family Law Facilitator Program (2015), (describing the process used in
California involving Family Law Facilitators in every court who are attorneys that do not work for the
child support agency and assist parents in filling out forms, running guideline calculations, answering
questions, and in some cases mediating cases); see also Obtaining Information on Your Client’s Case,
Mass. Dep’t Revenue, http://www.mass.gov/dor/child-support/iv-d-agencies-and-attorneys/attorneys/
(last visited May 29, 2016) (explaining that in Massachusetts state agency attorneys are not assigned to
every child support case; the Massachusetts Department of Revenue clarifies that “DOR attorneys
represent the Child Support Enforcement Division pursuing the Commonwealth’s interest in ensuring
that children are supported by their parents. We must allocate litigation resources in a balanced and
efficient manner, so as to benefit the greatest number of children in need of services. DOR’s strength
is in its access to information from employers, banks and other government agencies, allowing us to
generate high volume collections at low cost. DOR is not able to devote the resources and individual
attention to a case that private counsel may provide, not just for child support, but also for other issues
important to the family, such as parenting time, alimony and distribution of assets. We look forward to
working with members of the private bar to maximize our mutual strengths in ensuring that the child
support enforcement system serves the needs of the children and families of the Commonwealth.”).
90. Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap, supra note 3, at 25–26 (collecting
statistics from multiple states finding that a significant majority of litigants in family law and domestic
violence cases are unrepresented); Office of the Deputy Chief Admin. Judge for Justice Initiatives,
Self-Represented Litigants: Characteristics, Needs, Services 1 (2005) (finding that approximately
seventy-five percent of litigants in family court cases represent themselves).
91. Solomon-Fears, supra note 20, at 1 (“The CSE program is estimated to handle 50%–60% of
all child support cases.”).
92. See sources cited supra note 36.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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95

typically unrepresented. The parents who are seeking support may not
be considered parties to the action and also typically proceed without
96
their own counsel to represent their individual interests.
The participation of IV-D attorneys alters the dynamic of child
support hearings in several ways. First, IV-D attorneys inject the state’s
interest into the proceedings. IV-D attorneys do not represent the
interests of the parents nor the child in the case; IV-D attorneys
represent only the interests of the state in promoting the financial
97
support of children and recouping or preventing welfare expenditures.
The participation of IV-D attorneys in child support proceedings thereby
injects a third interest to be balanced alongside those of the individual

95. Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 8–9; Murphy, supra note 35, at 358; see also Brustin,
supra note 15, at 19–20.
96. See Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 8–9.
97. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 38-10-7.1 (2016) (“Any district attorney or attorney approved or
appointed by the Attorney General initiating legal proceedings at the request of the Department of
Human Resources to establish or enforce child support, . . . pursuant to the provisions of Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act and the laws of this state shall represent the State of Alabama, Department of
Human Resources, exclusively in said proceedings. No attorney-client relationship shall exist between
the IV-D attorney and any applicant or recipient of the agency’s support enforcement services, without
regard to the style of the case in which legal proceedings are initiated.”); Ark. Office of Child Support
Enf’t, Request for Child Support Services 2 (2010) (“OCSE attorneys do not represent either party, but
rather the state’s interest in seeing that the children receive the support to which they are entitled.”); Child
Support Services Program, Ill. Child Support Servs., http://www.childsupportillinois.com/
general/hfs1759.html (last visited May 29, 2016) (“When the judicial process is used, the Department is
represented by the county State’s Attorney’s Office or the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. These
legal representatives will handle the DCSS cases in circuit court as the attorneys for the Department
and do not legally represent CPs, in court or out of court, as clients. As a result, there are no attorneyclient relationships and any discussions between custodial parents and the Department’s attorneys are
not considered confidential or privileged under Illinois law.”); Md. Dep’t of Human Res., Child
Support Enforcement Administration Application for Support Enforcement Services (“An
attorney working in the child support enforcement program represents the Child Support
Enforcement Administration of the State of Maryland. The attorney [does not] represent you or your
personal interest and there is no attorney-client relationship between you and the attorney, between
you and the child support office, or any employees thereof. Any information you provide may not be
treated as confidential, except as provided by law. You may be required to appear as a witness in
court. Your failure to appear for court pursuant to an order or subpoena could result in your arrest.”);
Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Tennessee Child Support Handbook (2013) (“Attorneys handling
child support cases through the child support program represent the State of Tennessee and not you as
an individual. The attorney’s role is to establish paternity and set, enforce and modify support
according to the law.”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.109(d) (1995) (“An attorney employed to provide
Title IV-D services represents the interests of the state and not the interest of any other party.”); Wis.
Dep’t of Children & Families, Your Guide to Child Support Services 4 (Aug. 2015) (“The child
support attorney will handle legal issues connected with obtaining and enforcing a child support order.
However, their services do not include giving parents legal advice. A child support attorney who
appears at your court hearing is there to represent the interests of the state. The attorney does not
represent either parent. There is no attorney-client relationship between parents and child support
attorneys.”); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 15, at 34; Glesner Fines, supra
note 15, at 2155–56.
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litigants. As the state’s is typically the only interest in child support
proceedings that is represented by counsel, it may be disproportionately
benefitted, especially where IV-D attorneys appear frequently before the
99
same judges.
Second, IV-D attorney participation changes the flow and dynamic
of the courtroom. IV-D attorneys become fixtures in child support
courtrooms and may work in partnership with the judge, courtroom clerks,
and state paralegals to expeditiously progress through overcrowded
100
dockets. Hearings involving an attorney for the state can shift from
what otherwise would be a dialogue between the parents and the judge
to a dialogue primarily between the judge and the state’s attorney, with
101
parents called upon as needed. IV-D attorneys and the state thereby
take on a central role in child support courtrooms, and the individual
102
circumstances and interests of parent parties can be sidelined.
Third, the presence of IV-D attorneys at the petitioner’s table
alongside parents seeking child support creates a power imbalance,
projecting an image to the court of the power of the state supporting one
103
parent’s cause. Furthermore, because the state’s interest more often
aligns with that of the parent seeking support, pro se respondent parents
are left to square off against knowledgeable, experienced government
lawyers. This puts respondent parents at a disadvantage, as they
frequently lack an understanding of their rights and the child support
104
adjudication process.
98. Paula Roberts, Expedited Processes and Child Support Enforcement: A Delicate Balance Part I,
19 Clearinghouse Rev. 483, 483 (1985) (“Devising an equitable support enforcement system
frequently involves a delicate balance between the rights of custodial and noncustodial parents. . . . A
proper balance, which is difficult to achieve when only private parties are involved, is even more
difficult to achieve when the state becomes the real party in interest. . . . In these cases, recouping
benefits paid and/or preventing the need for public assistance becomes a factor in the process of
enforcing the support obligation. Indeed, protecting the public fisc becomes the state’s major goal.”).
99. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and
Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 Am. Soc. Rev. 909, 924–25 (2015). Sandefur notes
that “[l]awyer representation may act as an endorsement of lower-status parties that affects how
judges and other court staff treat them and evaluate their claims, perhaps because court staff believe
represented cases are more meritorious,” and that “[l]awyers who appear repeatedly before the same
court come to be seen as reliable, knowledgeable, and trustworthy by judges, who then give their
arguments more credence than those proffered by unknown attorneys.” Id.
100. See Kelly, supra note 36, at 302 (recounting in a fictional narrative based on the author’s
experience the state’s attorney calling roll and engaging in settlement negotiations with each of the
respondents at the request of the judge). See e.g., 26th Judicial Dist., Family Court Div., Local
Rules of Domestic Court r. 9 (2015) (“9.1 IV-D Child Support Cases are primarily heard in
Courtroom 8110. Periodically, court sessions may also be scheduled in Courtroom 8130. . . . IV-D
Attorneys and Agents shall be in court no later than 7:30 a.m. and remain until all cases are
resolved.”).
101. Authors’ observations, D.C. Superior Court (Sept. 2015–Mar. 2016).
102. Hatcher, supra note 41, at 1078; Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 7–8.
103. See supra note 98.
104. Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 8–9.
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Although petitioning parents can be somewhat advantaged by having
the state’s support in the courtroom, they often feel disempowered or
105
excluded by the process. Petitioning parents must cooperate with IV-D
attorneys to advance their claims, but the absence of an attorney-client
relationship strips petitioning parents of the authority to control the
objectives of the litigation. They also do not benefit from the duties of
competence, confidentiality, and loyalty required of lawyers who
106
represent individual clients. The high volume of cases IV-D attorneys
must manage can inhibit IV-D attorneys from having contact with
petitioning parents outside of the courtroom, establishing rapport, or
105. Hatcher, supra note 41, at 1066. See generally Kelly, supra note 36 (recounting the experiences
of a representative custodial parent in a fictional narrative based on the true experiences of the author
in child support courtrooms). This story resonates with the authors’ own experiences in child support
courtrooms and stories told to the authors by their clients.
106. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. Office of the Att’y Gen., Basic Services Package (2012),
http://cssd.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cssd/page_content/attachments/CSSD%20BSP%20Aug%202012
%20B%20Saveable.pdf (“CSSD attorneys will take the legal steps necessary to establish parentage
and establish, modify (including downward modifications if the mandatory three-year review and
adjustment indicates a lower child support amount is warranted) and enforce support obligations.
CSSD attorneys represent the District of Columbia ONLY. There is no attorney-client relationship
between you and the child support attorney or between you and CSSD or its staff. CSSD attorneys
DO NOT represent you, and information you provide to these attorneys is NOT protected by the
attorney-client privilege. CSSD attorneys represent the District in making sure that children are
supported and in collecting overdue support. You may be required to appear as a witness or take other
action in connection with the case.”); State of Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs., Application for Services
(2016), http://dcss.dhs.georgia.gov/sites/dcss.dhs.georgia.gov/files/ DCSSEnglish_Packet_I_0.pdf (“DCSS
may use an attorney to establish, enforce and/or modify my child support order. There is no attorneyclient relationship between me and the attorney, as the attorney represents the State. I understand
that the attorney does not handle legal issues such as legitimation, custody or visitation; therefore, I
must seek my own private attorney regarding these issues.”); State of Haw. Dep’t of the Att’y Gen.,
Child Support Enf’t Agency, Application for Services (2008), http://ag.hawaii.gov/csea/files/2013/
07/app_for_serv.pdf (“I acknowledge that the Agency’s attorneys are not my private attorneys. They
represent the interests of the State of Hawaii, and there is no creation of an attorney-client
relationship between the Agency’s attorneys and me. I understand that the Agency is authorized to
undertake whatever action is necessary to locate the parent(s), establish paternity, establish and/or
enforce child support obligations, review and adjust support orders, and to execute in my name any
pleadings relative to legal action pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. I also agree that
the decision of how to proceed in my case is the Agency’s, and not mine.”); Iowa Dep’t of Human
Servs., Application for Nonassistance Support Services (2016), https://secureapp.dhs.state.ia.us/
CustomerWeb/Resources/GeneralInfo/470-0188.pdf (“I understand that when the Unit accepts this
application for services, one of the people with whom I may discuss my case is an attorney who is an
employee of the Unit or the Attorney General’s office. None of the services provided to me establish
an attorney-client relationship with either the Unit or the attorney. The attorney works for the state of
Iowa and represents only the state. By turning in this application, I admit that I understand and accept
this condition.”); Kan. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., Child Support Services Handbook 7
(2015) (“No Attorney-Client Relationship: The attorneys who work for the CSS program work only
for the Secretary of DCF. Even if you benefit from their work, they do not represent you. They cannot
give you legal advice. They cannot do any legal work on your case that goes beyond CSS services. The
role of the CSS attorney in the child support case is to act in the public interest to make sure parents
support their children. If the other parent raises issues that are beyond CSS services, [such as
parenting time or custody,] you will need to talk with a lawyer of your own to protect your rights or for
personal legal advice.”); Glesner Fines, supra note 15.
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developing a thorough understanding of parents’ circumstances and the
107
facts of their cases.
Fourth, the investment of IV-D resources into child support cases has
led some civil legal services organizations to reduce their representation of
parents in paternity and child support matters. Lacking sufficient funding
to meet more than a fraction of the need for legal assistance, legal
services organizations across the United States have been forced to
108
triage.
With IV-D programs providing at least some attorney
involvement in child support cases, albeit to support the interest of the
state rather than either parent, many legal services organizations have
concentrated their family law resources in domestic relations courtrooms
and civil protection order courtrooms where no legal assistance is readily
109
available. In this way, the widespread involvement of IV-D agencies in
child support courtrooms has indirectly reduced the availability of legal
assistance for parents in these proceedings.
II. A New Model—Decreasing Government Involvement in Family
Law Courts, Streamlining IV-D Functions, and Increasing Access to
Community-Based Legal and Social Services
The IV-D system is ripe for fundamental change. Rather than
further enlarging the scope of the IV-D program and continuing its
involvement in private family law matters, it is time for states and the
federal government to reconfigure the IV-D program. This redesigned
system should reduce the government’s role in court proceedings,
streamline IV-D functions, and expand legal, social, and employment
services for families seeking to develop workable parenting and child
support arrangements.
A. Halting Mandatory Assignment
As a critical first step, states, with the support of Congress and HHS,
should stop requiring parents to assign their rights to collect child
110
support to the state as a condition of receiving TANF benefits. Policy
analysts and academics have long argued that passing through all
assigned funds would encourage non-custodial parents to comply with
111
support orders. A growing number of experts have now gone further
and argue that the assignment requirement is a policy that is no longer

107. This observation is based, in part, in the authors’ experiences representing clients in child
support courtrooms. See Davis, supra note 26, at 980; Hatcher, supra note 36, at 910–11; Kelly, supra
note 36.
108. See Legal Servs. Corp., supra note 2, at 1–2.
109. See Brustin, supra note 28, at 45–46.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2016) (“No assistance for families not assigning certain support rights
to the State.”).
111. Waller & Plotnick, supra note 78, at 52–53; see Turetsky, supra note 23.
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112

effective or economically justified. As little as fourteen percent of the
IV-D caseload consists of TANF cases, and in many of these cases the
113
obligor is of low income or unemployed. As a result, states are
expending significant effort to recover welfare reimbursement from
individuals who have little or no income to collect. It is questionable
whether state collections in TANF cases actually recoup the cost of
114
pursuing them.
Mandatory assignment policies also interfere with the ability of
parents to determine whether and how to share their responsibilities to
financially support their children, thereby compromising parental
115
autonomy. As one example, parents who prefer to provide in-kind
116
support—such as goods or services instead of money —to their children
may not be able to afford to do so once a formal child support order is
117
entered. Moreover, parents who receive TANF benefits risk committing
welfare fraud if they continue to accept in-kind support or direct child
118
support payments from co-parents after assignment is established. By
restricting parents’ ability to work out financial support issues
themselves, mandatory assignment policies can increase tension and

112. Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 35, at 9; Murphy, supra note 35, at 344–64; see Brustin &
Martin, supra note 10, at 811–13.
113. See supra note 24.
114. Some states have already shifted to a system in which all or most of the support collected
through mandatory assignment is passed through to the resident parent and children. In addition,
federal law has encouraged states, through partial federal reimbursement, to pass-through significant
amounts of support collected through mandatory assignment and disregard the funds when calculating
TANF payments. See, e.g., 2015 Child Support and Family Law Legislative Enactments by Topic, Nat’l
Conf. St. Legislatures (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/2015-child-supportand-family-law-legislative-enactments-by-topic.aspx#ChildSupportPrevention (discussing Colorado
SB 12, which requires the state department of human services to pass-through or distribute all funds
collected via mandatory assignment to the recipient of cash assistance, and Minnesota SB 1458, which
authorizes an income disregard of up to $100 for a TANF recipient with one child and up to $200 for a
TANF recipient with two children). However, approximately half of all states retain all assigned
monies collected. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2B-7 (West 2004); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 111-c(d)
(McKinney 2012); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4374(c) (West 2008). See generally Child Support PassThrough and Disregard Policies for Public Assistance Recipients, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Oct.
6, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/state-policy-pass-through-disregard-child-support.aspx.
When noncustodial parents make late, lump sum payments or have resources forcibly seized through
means such as tax intercept programs, the entirety of the balance owed may go directly to the
government, even if the funds that would have passed through to the child were the amounts owed
paid voluntarily and on time.
115. See Hatcher, supra note 81, at 781–82; Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts,
the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 535 (2013).
116. Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Irwin Garfinkel, Child Support Enforcement and Fathers’
Contributions to Their Nonmarital Children, 84 Soc. Serv. Rev. 341, 342 (2010).
117. Hatcher, supra note 77, at 1045, 1069; Maldonado, supra note 34, at 1005–09.
118. See Kohn, supra note 115, at 539–44.
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acrimony between parents, which can undermine their ability to
119
effectively co-parent their child.
Researchers and policy analysts further posit that mandatory
assignment policies disincentivize the payment of support and negatively
impact the relationship between parents obligated to pay support and
120
their children. Such parents might perceive that child support payments
assigned to the state do not benefit their children. This perception might
encourage parents to pursue employment in the underground economy
121
where the state cannot garnish wages.
Mandatory assignment diverts limited funds from the families who
most need them to a government bureaucracy whose services the families
may neither need nor desire. To conserve IV-D resources and better
address those cases in which parents want state assistance in collecting or
enforcing child support, states should no longer compel parents receiving
public benefits to assign their rights to child support.
B. Recalibrating the Role of the State
It is time to recalibrate the role and scope of the IV-D program. The
IV-D program should adopt a transparent and pragmatic focus on
administrative assessment, collection, and distribution of child support
payments. This streamlined approach would leave disputes that implicate
fundamental parental rights concerning paternity, support, custody, and
visitation to independent legal service providers, neutral mediators, and
impartial judges.
If federal law no longer required the assignment of support to the
state in TANF cases, then the state would have no direct pecuniary
122
interest to justify involvement in private child support cases. Congress
and OCSE have suggested that the IV-D program furthers the state’s
interests in ensuring that children are financially supported as well as in
123
preventing future welfare dependence. However, in private family law
119. Id. Studies show that one of the most significant factors contributing to father absence is
conflict with the mother. Id. at 521; see also Hatcher, supra note 81, at 781–84; Waller & Plotnick,
supra note 78, at 30–31.
120. See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 115, at 534–35; Turetsky, supra note 23, at 404.
121. Peter Edelman et al., Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men 130 (2006); Carmen
Solomon-Fears, Cong. Research Serv., Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their
Children 13 (2012) (discussing the perception among nonresident fathers that money assigned
benefits the government rather than their children).
122. States may retain a pecuniary interest in cases in which children have been removed from
their parents and placed in the custody of the state through child abuse and neglect proceedings. 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(17) (2016). See generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Collateral Children: Consequence and
Illegality at the Intersection of Foster Care and Child Support, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1333, 1334 (2009)
(suggesting reforms to address the policy concerns and illegal practices involving foster care and child
support).
123. Solomon-Fears, supra note 50, at 10–11; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 66,
at 1−2.
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proceedings, outside of the abuse and neglect context, the involvement of
government attorneys representing the separate interest of the state is
124
inappropriate and unnecessary. The state’s generalized interest in
supporting children and avoiding welfare dependence does not justify
state intervention in private civil disputes simply because they relate to
an attenuated family policy goal.
Removing the state from child support adjudications would create a
more level playing field for parents and would conserve court resources
to address those disputes in which one or both parents actually desire
court intervention. Courts would no longer need to consider the asserted
interest of the state in these proceedings, but could concentrate on the
interests of the parties and the child—those who must actually live with
the judgment. Halting state participation in child support proceedings
would also better allow for the integrated resolution of custody and child
125
support issues without state interference.
A primarily administrative IV-D system designed to assess, collect,
distribute, and enforce support would suffice to serve the state’s
generalized interest in ensuring support of children and avoiding welfare
dependence. IV-D state agencies could concentrate their efforts and
resources on locating income and assets, calculating child support
obligations, protecting the privacy of identity-related information, managing
the collection and distribution of support, and using administrative
remedies to enforce child support agreements or court orders. All of
these tasks are central to the program’s ultimate goal of directing financial
support to children whose parents are not voluntarily providing such
126
support.
Under a more streamlined model, IV-D agencies would limit their
role in child support matters to calculating and providing a child support
assessment at the request of a parent or the court. Agencies would use
tax, employment, social security disability benefits, unemployment
insurance benefits, and other income or asset-related records in
government databases to generate the assessment. Parents, mediators,

124. Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 844.
125. Id. at 812–13. But see Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor
People’s Courts, 22 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 473, 480 (2015) (“[T]he proactive and
interventionist role of the court in family cases suggests that the concept of ‘private party cases’ as
distinct from those initiated by the state is misleading. Family courts have abandoned the latent role
associated with civil courts to take a more active role in case management and fact-finding, with
continued detrimental results.”).
126. To facilitate this change, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement should develop
new performance measures for state IV-D programs that value using resources to locate and uncover
assets in cases in which individuals are believed to be understating or hiding income or assets.
Congress has established five measures by which to measure annual state IV-D performance including:
paternity establishment, establishment of support orders, current payment levels, arranged payment
levels, and program cost-effectiveness. 42 U.S.C. § 658a(b)(4) (2016).
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and courts could then use these support assessments to come to
127
voluntary support agreements or as evidence in adjudications.
IV-D agencies would focus more attention on operating the state
centralized child support collection and distribution units, which
administer wage garnishments, maintain payment history records, and
128
ensure that support is distributed to the correct parties.
These
functions require the manpower, technical capacity, and oversight that
government agencies are uniquely suited to provide. Finally, IV-D
agencies would continue to engage in administrative enforcement of
unpaid support orders through bank seizures, tax intercepts, license
129
revocations, and suspension of passports. The state has the capacity to
manage the volume of data and to employ the labor required to
undertake these enforcement efforts as well as a strong interest in and
obligation to protect the identity-related information uncovered through
130
these efforts.
127. In carrying out this function, the government would have to balance the need to provide an
accurate assessment with the duty to protect the privacy of identity-related information. The IV-D
agencies have access to wage information and new hires databases. They interface with other
government tax, employment, and public benefits agencies to identify obligor assets such as income
tax refunds, unemployment compensation, and lottery winnings. They also interface with private
entities such as banks and other financial institutions to identify assets. See U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., supra note 16, at 23–24. The ability to shield information is particularly critical in
situations involving domestic violence or child abuse.
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id. at 23–24. The IV-D agency is the executive agency most likely to have access to the
databases and interagency networks to accomplish such administrative enforcement. Parents should be
afforded due process protections including the right to object to such seizures and have their objection
heard by a neutral fact finder in a civil or administrative court prior to the government taking such
actions. These investigatory and enforcement tools are especially critical when a noncustodial parent
lives outside of the child’s state of residence or outside of the United States. In such circumstances,
laws empowering IV-D agencies to share information with one another and with related international
agencies can overcome geographical, jurisdictional, and privacy barriers that can stymie custodial
parents’ efforts to establish and enforce child support orders. As IV-D agencies are in the best position
to coordinate efforts and share confidential information with other government agencies, interstate
and international child support establishment and enforcement should be a central function of IV-D
programs. See, e.g., Letter from Vicki Turetsky, Comm’r Office of Child Support Enf’t, to State IV-D
Directors (Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with authors) (directing state agencies to provide information
regarding state support procedures which OCSE will use to prepare reports needed in preparation for
U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other
Forms of Family Maintenance).
130. In terms of civil contempt, states should alter their involvement in civil contempt proceedings
in one of two ways. One alternative is for the IV-D agency to refrain from participating in civil
contempt litigation altogether and leave it to private parties to pursue or defend these actions pro se
or represented by counsel. The Supreme Court decision in Turner v. Rogers makes it clear that while
appointment of counsel in civil contempt cases is not constitutionally required, at least where both the
petitioner and respondent are proceeding pro se, courts must implement adequate procedural
safeguards to protect the due process rights of defendants. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2518, 2520
(2011); see Brustin, supra note 15. Therefore, courts would need to ensure that defendants are aware
of the standards of proof and have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. A second option could be
for the state to elect to initiate select civil contempt cases at the behest of the parent owed support.
The Turner Court specifically notes that the question of whether counsel is required for defendants in
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States might consider referring cases in which the only issue to be
adjudicated is the accuracy of IV-D child support assessments to
131
administrative tribunals.
Administrative courts review executive
agency determinations, and these tribunals offer parties the opportunity
to be heard by a neutral fact finder. They typically operate under
expedited, informal procedures and relaxed rules of evidence, making
132
them accessible to pro se parties. Given the private nature of the
dispute between the parties, there would be no need for IV-D lawyers or
133
personnel to represent the state in these proceedings.
C. Creating New Federal and State Initiatives That Direct
Funding to Community-Based Legal, Social, and Employment
Services for Parents
Both the efforts to rebrand the OCSE mission and to incorporate
parenting time determinations into child support cases represent
attempts to strengthen the financial and social well being of low-income
families. The focus on the underlying needs of these families is laudable,
civil contempt actions might be answered affirmatively when it is the state initiating the claim and
government lawyers are litigating against a pro se defendant. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520. Therefore, in
light of Turner, in those cases it would be prudent for the court to appoint an attorney for the parent
against whom the action is filed if that parent cannot afford one.
131. This administrative review of an executive agency decision concerning a dispute between two
private entities is akin to unemployment insurance benefits determinations. Claims examiners at state
departments of employment make an initial determination as to whether benefits should be granted.
The employee or employer has a right to an administrative appeal of the decision. See, e.g., Filing a
Claim, State Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t, http://www.edd.ca.gov/unemployment/Filing_a_Claim.htm (last
visited May 29, 2016); Appeals Information for Claimants and Employers, S.C. Dep’t Emp. &
Workforce, http://dew.sc.gov/appeals.asp (last visited May 29, 2016); Start Your Unemployment
Compensation Process, DC.gov: Dep’t Emp. Servs., http://does.dc.gov/service/start-your-unemploymentcompensation-process (last visited May 29, 2016). In Washington, D.C., for example, employees or
employers appealing decisions may have a representative or lawyer representing them. There are nonprofit programs as well as private sector companies or firms available to provide legal representation.
See D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., District of Columbia Unemployment Insurance: Claimant’s
Rights and Responsibilities 9–10, 12 (2015). Representatives or attorneys for the D.C. government
are only involved in proceedings in which there is a dispute about the Department of Employment
Service’s eligibility or benefit calculations or when the government is the employer. Generally, these
appeals are treated as disputes between two private parties. See, e.g., You May Be Able to Get Free Legal
Help for this Case, DC.gov, http://oah.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oah/publication/attachments/
CAP_EAP_Flyer.pdf (last visited May 29, 2016); The Hearing Process: Frequently Asked Questions,
N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, https://www.labor.ny.gov/ui/claimantinfo/hearingprocess.shtm#hp17 (last visited
May 29, 2016).
132. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. Pub. L. 123,
134–38 (1993) (positing that full hearings do not benefit pro se litigants and advocating to eliminate
hearings on matters lacking meaningful factual disputes).
133. Instead of the IV-D agency initiating child support cases as a party to the case, individuals
could file directly with the courts (particularly if there are issues of paternity, custody and/or visitation
to address) or file for an administrative assessment. If agreed to by the parties, an administrative
assessment could become an enforceable child support order. If not agreed to by both parties, then the
person requesting support could seek review and adjudication in a family court or administrative
tribunal.
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however, federal and state child support programs are ill-suited for
accomplishing these goals. IV-D agencies operate under funding and
performance standards designed to achieve specific collection and
enforcement goals. These agencies have developed the expertise needed
134
to advance these performance goals, however, IV-D agencies are
neither well equipped nor well positioned to advance the broader family
goals policymakers have in mind.
Low-income families frequently have significant government
involvement in their private lives, including regular interactions with law
enforcement officials, public benefits case workers, and child protection
135
services officials. In many cases, parents perceive these interactions as
invasive and persecutory, and these encounters result in punitive actions
that likely would not occur absent the high level of government scrutiny
136
these families experience. Low-income families often do not trust that
the involvement of government-affiliated workers in their lives will help
them. Instead they seek services from community organizations that help
137
families address their needs on their own terms.
Rather than funding cadres of IV-D lawyers and paralegals to
negotiate and litigate paternity, support, and parenting matters, state
138
legislatures and Congress should redirect this funding to existing or
134. See Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645
(1998); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 60, at 286–87.
135. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 Yale J.
L. & Feminism 317, 331–38 (2013).
136. See, e.g., Joan M. Shaughnessy, Essay on Poverty and Child Neglect: New Interventions,
21 Wash. & Lee J. C.R. & Soc. Just. 5, 12–14 (2014).
137. See, e.g., Jonathan Blazer & Brett Murphy, Addressing the Needs of Immigrants and Limited
English Communities in Disaster Planning and Relief: Lessons for Government, Disaster Relief
Agencies, and Community-Based Organizations, 22 Immigrants’ Rts. Update 8, 2–3 (2008); see also
Alana Landey & Alexander Coccia, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Community Action
Agency Activities in Affordable Care Act Outreach and Enrollment: Insights from Case
Studies (2015).
138. See Solomon-Fears, supra note 121, at 1–3, 5–6 (discussing direct federal funding for
responsible fatherhood programs including HHS Office of Family Assistance awards of $55 million in
competitive responsible fatherhood grants issued in October 2015 as well as indirect government and
private funding for fatherhood initiatives through the TANF program, state Maintenance of Effort
[MOE] expenditures, and social services block grants.) The White House Office of Faith-based and
Neighborhood Partnerships coordinates Centers for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships in
several federal agencies including the Department of Labor, Department of Homeland Security, and
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Justice, and Veterans Affairs as well the Small Business Administration, Corporation
for National and Community Service, US. Agency for International Development and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Each Center partners with faith-based and neighborhood
organizations to advance certain policy goals including responsible fathering and full employment. For
example, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) Center works with community groups to strengthen job
training and workforce development programs. See About the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about (last visited
May 29, 2016). The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement awards $10 million in grants to states
and territories through the Access and Visitation (“AV”) Program. This, however, is a relatively small
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new community-based initiatives focused on strengthening parenting and
support of children. Congress could redirect the IV-D funding to develop
a new program under the auspices of HHS, or as a joint program among
HHS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice.
Whatever the form, the program would need to fund community-based
organizations as well as problem solving and community courts that
address the multiple intersecting legal, social, and employment needs of
low-income parents struggling to support their children and endeavoring
139
to establish meaningful, realistic parenting arrangements.
Several reasons support confining the government’s role to
facilitating the frontline efforts of community-based organizations and
courts, rather than providing such services directly. First, an extensive
network of legal and social services organizations exists to provide assistance
140
to parents and children around the country. These organizations have
substantive expertise in the applicable legal and regulatory regimes and
an understanding of the complexity and variation of family configurations
141
characteristic of the communities they serve. The government need not
recreate this infrastructure, particularly when existing community-based
organizations desperately need financial and technical support to serve
those seeking assistance.
Second, community-based organizations represent the interests of
the individuals and families they serve, rather than the policy objectives
of the state. This clarity of mission and allegiance places these
organizations in a strong position to earn the trust of community members
who might otherwise distrust police and government agencies.

amount of money given the broad scope of activities that the grant program funds and the geographic
area it covers. States and territories can use these grants to fund services. Access and Visitation, Off.
Child Support Enforcement, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/grants/access-visitation (last visited
May 29, 2016). The most frequently provided service funded through the AV program is parent
education (41%) followed by mediation services (24%), development of parenting plans (18%),
visitation enforcement (12%), and counseling services (5%). Office of Child Support Enf’t, Access
and Visitation Grant Program FY 2013 Update (Nov. 2014).
139. See Solomon-Fears, supra note 121, at 6 (“To help fathers and mothers meet their parental
responsibilities, many policy analysts and observers support broad-based collaborative strategies that
go beyond welfare and child support agencies and include schools, work programs, prison systems,
churches, community organizations, and the health care system.”).
140. The Legal Services Corporation, for example, provides funding to 134 independent, nonprofit legal services agencies around the United States and in U.S. territories as well as the District of
Columbia. For a listing of agencies receiving funding, see Find Legal Aid, Legal Servs. Corp.,
http://www.lsc.gov/what-legal-aid/find-legal-aid (last visited May 29, 2016).
141. See, e.g., Civil Legal Aid 101, U.S. Dep’t Just., https://www.justice.gov/atj/civil-legal-aid-101 (last
visited May 29, 2016) (“LSC-funded organizations comprise about 25% of the total number of civil legal aid
providers nationally. There are hundreds of independently-run nonprofit civil legal aid programs that don’t
get LSC funds and that may focus on particular populations or issues (e.g., children, homeless, people with
disabilities, veterans, etc.), provide more generalized services including legal aid, coordinate pro bono
programs, or specialize in self-help services including legal aid, coordinate pro bono programs, or specialize in
self-help assistance.”).
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Third, community-based organizations and community courts are
positioned to tailor their services and approaches to the neighborhoods
and populations they serve, and better able to innovate and implement
comprehensive approaches to complex challenges than government
142
143
bureaucracies.
For example, problem-solving
and community
144
145
courts address the needs and disputes of litigants in a holistic way.
Such courts aim to remedy underlying structural barriers that prevent
parents from complying with court orders in order to more adequately and
permanently resolve disputes.
It is difficult to ascertain the total amount of state and federal
funding expended on attorneys and other court-related staff hired to
mediating, negotiating, and litigating IV-D paternity and child support
matters in trial or administrative courts because most state budgets do
not provide detailed salary information. A few figures offer limited
insight into this question. In Maryland, for example, approximately
$3,000,000 was appropriated in the 2015 state budget to fund IV-D
146
attorneys. In Florida, under a fiscal year 2015 contract with the State of
Florida Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”), the Florida Department
of Revenue agreed to pay OAG up to $6,841,910 for legal services
performed on behalf of Florida’s IV-D child support enforcement
147
program. The federal OCSE and independent researchers (using
Freedom of Information Act requests) would need to undertake more
142. Community-based organizations also provide or refer clients to obtain employment training,
GED training, and access to public benefits. Some of these organizations are already forming alliances
and partnerships with courts to offer low-income litigants information, referrals and representation in
paternity, support, and other family related disputes. Non-profit agencies can also develop courtannexed resource centers in which attorneys on site can offer advice, limited representation, or full
representation. See e.g., Special Projects, Legal Aid Soc’y D.C., http://www.legalaiddc.org/special-projects
(last visited May 29, 2016). The District of Columbia’s Child Support Community Legal Services
Project, a court annexed legal resource center located at the Superior Court provides one example.
The project is administered by two community-based organizations, the D.C. Legal Aid Society and
Bread for the City, and offers general legal advice concerning litigation of paternity and child support
cases, as well as limited and full representation.
143. Kohn, supra note 115, at 553–54.
144. See Community Court: Overview, Ctr. for Ct. Innovation, http://www.courtinnovation.org/
topic/community-court (last visited May 29, 2016).
145. Id.; see Cynthia G. Lee et al., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, A Community Court Grows in
Brooklyn: A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice Center 1–3 (2013).
146. See Md. Dep’t of Budget & Mgmt., FY 2017 Proposed Operating Budget Personnel
Detail vol. II, at 14–16 (2015). Paralegals were not separately identified so the funding allocated to
paralegals could not be calculated.
147. See Agreement Between the State of Fla. Off. of Att’y Gen. and Fla. Dep’t of Revenue Child
Support Enf’t Program, July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2014, at 1–6, 11, http://www.myfloridalegal.com/
CTRSweb.nsf/0/85257C8C006B03C385257CA600443B02/$file/CL9AG.pdf. Attached to the contract is FY
2009–2010 estimates of costs for Offices of the Attorney General in three counties. The estimated
salary and benefits costs for attorneys, paralegals, clerks and assistants are: $584,401 in Leon County;
$1,305,736 in Broward County; and $2,815,773 in St. Petersburg. Including all operating, litigation, and
administrative costs, the estimated contract totals are: $796,881 for Leon county; $1,813,359 for
Broward county; and $4,003,305 for St. Petersburg county.
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extensive research to determine the amount of funding expended with any
accuracy.
148
The Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”)
offers a model for promoting public policy goals designed to support lowincome and vulnerable families through funding of community-based
initiatives. HRSA “is the primary Federal agency for improving health
and achieving health equity through access to quality services, a skilled
149
health workforce and innovative programs.” HRSA issues more than
10,000 grants and supplements to 3000 partners to provide leadership
training, technical assistance, and funding to community-based health
care providers, schools, and local health systems in states and municipalities
150
throughout the United States. HRSA’s Health Center Program alone
provides grant funding to approximately 1300 programs providing
primary health care at more than 9200 clinics serving approximately
twenty-two million patients, many of whom are low income and struggling
151
to subsist.
HRSA’s programs, such as those funded under the auspices of the
Maternal and Child Health Bureau, are implemented by doctors, nurses,
caseworkers, and social workers who are integrated in their communities
152
and are knowledgeable about the needs of their patients. Although
federally funded, these health care professionals are not agents of the
state, but rather, are independent community partners providing critical
services to those in need. HRSA-funded centers address the needs of
their patients holistically, not only providing health care, but also services
addressing other social determinants of health such as substandard
153
housing conditions, substance abuse, and family violence.

148. HRSA is an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. About HRSA,
Health Resources & Servs. Admin., http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited May 29, 2016).
149. Id. (“HRSA’s programs provide health care to people who are geographically isolated,
economically or medically vulnerable.”).
150. See Strategic Plan FY 2016–2018, Health Resources & Servs. Admin., http://www.hrsa.gov/
about/strategicplan.html (last visited May 29, 2016).
151. Id. HRSA operates five additional programs including: the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program
which funds 900 organizations that provide health care services to individuals living with HIV; the
National Health Service Corps which provides funding (including loan repayment) to encourage
health care professionals to provide services in underserved communities; Health Workforce Training
Programs which fund training and education of technically skilled and culturally competent health
care professionals who are equipped to work in settings offering multidisciplinary team-based care; the
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant Program which issues grants to fifty-nine states and U.S.
territories to support quality health care for women, infants, and children, including children with
special health care needs; and the Rural Health Policy Program geared toward developing effective
policy and capacity building for underserved rural communities. Id. at 2–3.
152. See Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Health Resources & Servs. Admin.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/organization/bureaus/mchb/index.html (last visited May 29, 2016).
153. Inst. for Alt. Futures, Community Health Centers Leveraging the Social Determinants
of Health 4–5 (2012).
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The implementation of a dramatically different approach to
achieving parenting, employment, and child support policy goals is
possible and has the potential to increase access to justice. In contrast to
the government-centric approach taken in the IV-D child support
enforcement context to date, federal efforts to strengthen financial
support and encourage shared parenting should pursue an approach
more akin to HRSA and redirect funding to increase the availability of
154
social, employment, and legal services to low-income families.
Grant programs under the auspices of HHS, the Department of
Labor, and/or the Department of Justice could prioritize legal services
agencies offering a menu of services including limited advice and assistance
155
(court-annexed and independent), mediation services, agreement drafting
156
and review, limited appearances, and full representation. Funding could
also be targeted to community-based social services and employment
organizations providing parenting education, counseling, and mediation,
as well as skills education, job training, and meaningful assistance
157
securing employment. In this way, funding would promote innovation
and interdisciplinary collaboration as a means to strengthen parenting
and expand parents’ capacity to financially support children.
III. Risks of Proposals to Redesign the IV-D System and Favor
Private Dispute Resolution Model
Streamlining the IV-D system and redirecting resources to
community-based legal and social services would pose a number of risks
that cannot be ignored. Perhaps the biggest potential risk of
implementing the proposals outlined in Part II is that lawmakers could
divert funds from IV-D agency litigation budgets and syphon them off
for other purposes rather than appropriate funds to community-based
154. Congress has sought to promote healthy marriage and engaged fatherhood through grants to
government agencies, non-profits, and faith-based as well as community-based organizations. See
Solomon-Fears, supra note 121, at 6 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Implementing
Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Programs Within Different Organizational
Structures 1 (2012)).
155. See Kohn, supra note 115, at 551–52 (noting that studies have found that mediation reduces
conflict between parents and enhances their abilities to communicate with one another. This finding,
Kohn points out, applies to unmarried and married parents). Caution is warranted when incorporating
mediation services, to ensure that mediation is appropriately viewed as a means to conflict resolution
rather than an end in itself, and that mediators are adequately versed in the cultural and social context
of the community and trained to recognize and appropriately screen or manage cases involving a
history of domestic violence. See Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 839, 845–46.
156. Brustin, supra note 15, at 33–43 (highlighting the District of Columbia’s Child Support
Community Legal Services Project).
157. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, So, You Have a Minimum-Wage Job. Now What?, Wash. Post (Dec. 30,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/30/so-you-have-a-minimum-wage-job-nowwhat/ (discussing Jubilee Jobs, Move Up Program, a support and resource project tailored for individuals in
the Washington, D.C. job market trying to move from entry-level, minimum-wage jobs to higher
paying, secure employment).
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initiatives. The absence of funding allocated to support the recent federal
parenting time initiatives suggests that Congress lacks the will to provide
158
the resources needed to address parenting issues. Further, a strategy to
fund more lawyers, even if those lawyers are serving poor families, is
159
unlikely to garner much popular support. Thus, diminishing the legal
advocacy capacity of the IV-D program could eliminate the one existing
source of legal assistance available to parents of low and moderate
income seeking to establish parentage and to collect, modify, or enforce
support. Without an alternative option, parents in need of support could
find themselves in a worse position than they are in today.
Second, without more serious efforts to address wage stagnation,
unemployment, and underemployment, low-income parents will continue
160
to struggle to support their children. Reforms such as bolstering the
minimum wage; expanding earned income tax credits; making Medicaid
more accessible; increasing expenditures for adult education, substance
abuse treatment, and mental health services; expanding child care
subsidies; and loosening restrictions on expungement of criminal records
would bolster the financial position and social and emotional well-being
of low-income parents. Without meaningful progress on these issues,
low-income parents will continue to struggle to support their children
regardless of which government agency or program oversees child support
and parenting initiatives.
Third, shifting child support calculation and collection to largely
administrative processes might lead to an increase in unfair or inaccurate
determinations unless Congress and states implement effective
accountability mechanisms and meaningful remedies to redress errors.
Many states have created independent administrative tribunals to review
161
state agency determinations on substantive and procedural grounds.
The District of Columbia, for example, has established the Office of
Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) to review agency determinations.
158. The Congressional resolution enacted in 2014 merely urges IV-D to include parenting time in
child support orders but provides no additional funding for such initiatives. Preventing Sex Trafficking
and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 303(b)(2), 128 Stat. 1919, 1946 (2014) (“States
should use existing funding sources to support the establishment of parenting time arrangements,
including child support incentives, Access and Visitation Grants, and Healthy Marriage Promotion
and Responsible Fatherhood Grants.”).
159. See generally Alan Houseman, Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy, Civil Legal Aid in the United
States: An Update for 2013, at 1, 9 (2013) (anticipating that LSC appropriation would diminish even
more in 2014).
160. See Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in Low-Income Families,
20 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 1, 32–52 (2012).
161. See, e.g., Office of Administrative Hearings, oah.dc.gov (last visited May 29, 2016); Office of
Administrative Hearings, oregon.gov, http://www.oregon.gov/oah/pages/index.aspx (last visited May
29, 2016); Office of Administrative Hearings, Maryland.gov, http://www.oah.state.md.us/ (last visited
May 29, 2016); The Mission of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Ca.gov, http://www.dgs.ca.gov/
oah/ Home.aspx (last visited May 29, 2016); see also James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments
in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 401 (2005).
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OAH is an independent tribunal that is staffed by neutral adjudicators,
governed by comprehensive rules of procedure, and subject to appeals of
162
its decisions to the D.C. Court of Appeals. The neutrality of the
tribunal, the procedural protections governing its proceedings, and the
availability of appellate court review of its decisions make the OAH an
effective arbiter of procedural and substantive challenges to agency
determinations. This type of independent review is not available in all
163
states, so instead agencies use an internal administrative review process.
Without effective independent review, shifting child support calculations
and collections to administrative processes might grant agencies unbridled
authority without the transparency and recourse that court adjudication
164
provides.
Fourth, it is unclear whether there exists an adequate network of
community-based organizations throughout the country to meet the
demand for assistance with child support disputes that IV-D agencies
currently address. In rural areas in particular, the paucity of available
providers of legal services could create conflicts of interest preventing
agencies from representing a particular parent and ultimately preventing
165
that parent from obtaining assistance.
Finally, it is possible that streamlining the scope of IV-D services
will do little to change—and may exacerbate—the dual track system of
166
adjudication existing in family courts throughout the country.
Although government attorneys would no longer be involved in
mediating and litigating parentage and child support claims in the name
of a nebulous state interest, low-income litigants seeking child support
might end up cabined off into administrative processes—away from
courts entirely—while more affluent litigants continue to have the
opportunity to more easily resolve all issues in one proceeding in
167
domestic relations courts.
Conclusion
The size and ubiquity of the federal and state child support
bureaucracy make its current role and functions seem inevitable. The IV-D
program has made many important contributions, collecting significant
162. D.C. OAH is accessible by public transportation and consists of numerous private hearing
rooms as well as a staffed resources center to assist pro se claimants.
163. See A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdiction: Is There a Deference?, 29 J.
Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 1, 37–40 (2009).
164. Further, IV-D agencies are often unwilling to share with parents information gleaned from
interstate databases or other sources and therefore parents would not have the information necessary
to contest agency decisions or pursue other remedies in court or administrative tribunals.
165. See Rural Pro Bono Project, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/
projects_awards/rural_pro_bono_project.html (last visited May 29, 2016).
166. Brustin & Martin, supra note 10, at 805–06, 812–15.
167. Id.
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amounts of child support on behalf of low-income families and enabling
advances in the aggregation of data to facilitate child support
enforcement. At the same time, the insertion of IV-D personnel into
parentage and child support cases has materially impacted the balance
and focus of private family law proceedings in ways detrimental to lowincome parents, and the level of intervention is poised to expand. Rather
than enlarging the scope and reach of IV-D child support programs, they
should be streamlined to focus on their strengths. Congress and states
should then redirect funding to community-based organizations and
courts that provide legal, employment, and social services aimed at
facilitating engaged parenting and strengthening financial support of
children.
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